Introduction
Access to influence is often controlled by a small number of gatekeepers: Political motions must be endorsed by a member of parliament, academics vie for publication in a handful of top scientific journals, and hosts of startup companies compete for financial support from a limited number of venture capitalists. In all of these applications, market participants are heterogeneous with respect to their desirability and information is imperfect and often asymmetric. The impact of this informational friction is felt on both sides of the market: Uninformed gatekeepers have to base all decisions on noisy signals, and experts on the other side can no longer fully anticipate match outcomes. This risk of rejection forces experts to strategically target their search, which affects the equilibrium both in terms of match outcomes and strategic incentives.
Understanding the allocation process is crucial since realized matches ultimately shape public opinion, lawmaking, the direction of future research and technological progress. Yet, several relevant questions remain without satisfactory answers: For instance, under what conditions is matching assortative? How can gatekeepers attract better matches? Do these strategic considerations differ for the best and the worst gatekeeper? What are the welfare implications of this nonstandard competitive environment?
To address these questions, this paper proposes a tractable dynamic matching model where a continuum of experts seek to promote ideas through one of finitely many channels, each of which is controlled by a separate gatekeeper. An expert can propose to at most one gatekeeper at any given time, and then has to stand by idly while the gatekeeper makes her final match decision.
Being unable to fully anticipate the success of a given proposal and eager to find a match as quickly as possible, the impatient expert thus has to balance high-impact options against less competitive 'safe bets'. Three characteristics determine his optimal proposal order over gatekeepers: the impact of each channel, response times, and his equilibrium acceptance odds. Since time is particularly precious to an expert with several promising avenues, the cost of each proposal is endogenously determined.
A gatekeeper's objective is straightforward: She seeks to match with the highest-quality experts subject to a finite flow capacity. Due to informational frictions, she however has to base her decision on an imperfect signal of expert quality -taking into account that her acceptance criteria not only affects which proposals she accepts, but also who proposes to her in the first place. Contrary to the impatient experts, the long-lived gatekeepers do not discount the future. Example 1. To illustrate the setup, consider a stylized case with two gatekeepers. The impact of the bottom gatekeeper is normalized to one and she immediately accepts all proposals. The top gatekeeper has an impact of two, but takes six months before deciding on any proposal and only accepts those with a high enough signal. As a result, only the highest-quality experts propose to the top gatekeeper first: Their signal draws are usually high, so they expect their proposal to be accepted. Lower-quality experts instead prefer to match immediately with the bottom gatekeeper in order to avoid the delay of a rejected proposal. Consequently, the top gatekeeper here only receives proposals from the upper tail of the quality spectrum. She however rejects even good experts with positive probability. These experts go on to propose to the bottom gatekeeper, who therefore receives proposals of all qualities, as illustrated in Figure 1 .
The discussion of expert incentives in this simple setup may suggest that sorting naturally ensues in equilibrium, in the sense that high impact gatekeepers are more selective than their lowimpact counterparts and that only the best experts first propose to the top gatekeeper. When endogenizing gatekeeper's acceptance strategies however, both sides of the market may display nonmonotone equilibrium behavior. Specifically, I identify limiting conditions that either guarantee or prevent each of the sorting failures and illustrate via examples how these situations may occur under realistic parameter values. This serves as a cautionary tale when an uninformed outsider makes inferences from observed equilibrium behavior. In doing so naively, he may well end up drawing false conclusions on agents' actual desirability.
The strategic targeting by experts shapes gatekeepers' proposal distribution, and it seems natural that they may seek to exploit it in their favor. In the simple example of Figure 1 , experts' self-selection essentially filters out the lowest-quality proposals for the top gatekeeper. The filtering here is perfect due to the unconditional acceptance by the bottom gatekeeper. In an actual equilibrium, this effect is less pronounced but the basic intuition maintains: A gatekeeper may prefer to decrease her own desirability in order to reduce her inflow of proposals, but then accept the remaining proposals more easily. By guiding experts' proposal strategy through incentives, she partially circumvents her informational disadvantage.
To incorporate such manipulation, I allow gatekeepers to add red tape in the form of artificially delaying acceptance decisions beyond the (exogenously given) time required for signal generation.
In a setup with two gatekeepers, I show that such red tape occurs in equilibrium and only at the top, exactly when the impact differential is large. In reality, multiple forms of red tape are imaginable, ranging from unnecessary delay over specific customization requirements to gratuitous access hurdles that make it more costly to contact to a gatekeeper. 1 The intuition presented here applies to all of them, even though the exact impact on the match distribution may vary slightly.
It is worth highlighting that these results obtain even when signal generation is completely costless. If reviewing proposals is instead taxing for gatekeepers, this yields an additional reason to employ disincentives: Fewer proposals means less resources are wasted to evaluate experts that are ultimately rejected. Any such consideration would only strengthen the result.
The existence of red tape has important efficiency implications and may come at a significant social cost. Nevertheless, I identify conditions under which red tape improves match assortativity and thereby actually raises welfare. As such, even when technological innovations allow drastic reductions in response times, it may not be socially optimal to fully exploit these possibilities.
When experts differ on an observable, quality-irrelevant attribute, gatekeepers have yet another way of exploiting expert self-selection: By conditioning proposal acceptance on the attribute, the gatekeeper becomes more easily accessible to experts within a target group, and in turn receives more proposals from that group. Such horizontal differentiation occurs for instance within academic publishing, where lower-ranked journals often specialize in a specific sub-discipline while the top journals span the entire field. This asymmetry can be motivated from the nonstandard competitive framework that they are participating in.
Indeed, there is an immediate negative effect from specialization: Nontarget proposals are now rejected to make room for target proposals with a lower signal. However, as experts react to these new acceptance rules, the gatekeeper also secures additional proposals in the target group and loses some nontarget proposals. As such, specialization partially replaces a gatekeeper's own proposals with those that previously went to her competitor first. Now, since experts from the upper tail of the quality distribution first propose to the top gatekeeper, the sign of this indirect effect depends on the strategic position of the gatekeeper: It is positive for the bottom gatekeeper, but negative for the top (who would rather conserve her own proposals). As such, the top gatekeeper doesn't have any incentives for specialization, but the bottom gatekeeper endogenously limits his scope when the indirect effect outweighs.
Unfortunately, equilibrium strategies are less straightforward since the top gatekeeper may still react to a differential acceptance policy of her competitor, even if she never unilaterally specializes.
As such, the asymmetry between gatekeepers' taste for specialization is an off-equilibrium resultthe endogenous occurence of specialization however maintains even in equilibrium.
Related Literature. Equilibrium sorting is a central concern in the decentralized matching literature. Limiting my discussion to the case of non-transferable utility where match surplus is divided exogenously, Gale and Shapley (1962) establish that aligned preferences alone are sufficient to ensure assortative matching in the absence of search frictions. When search is time-consuming but match opportunities arise randomly, shows that assortative matching ensues under the preference structure considered here: Equilibrium matches are characterized by an intervalpartition over the type space, in the sense that agents within the same interval match up while all others keep searching. Stochastic assortative matching prevails even under informational frictions, where agents merely observe a noisy signal of their potential partner's type (Chade, 2006) . The introduction of directed search however breaks assortativity, as Chade et al. (2014) show in closely related model with costly but simultaneous, one-shot search. These nonmonotonic equilibrium strategies maintain under the sequential search considered here. However, they no longer occur independently for the two sides. More generally, the main advantage of the present framework lies in its tractability: Contrary to the former model, equilibrium is (essentially) unique and well defined for any finite number of gatekeepers. It is thanks to these clear equilibrium predictions that a meaningful discussion of gatekeepers' competitive incentives becomes possible. Moreover, the multiplicity in their setting is generated by the fact that experts can make proposals at a single point in time -they cannot later pursue new options if their initial proposals do not work out. In applications where no such hard deadline exists, the current framework may thus offer a better fit.
Previous papers have explored competition among academic journals, albeit in a partial equilibrium setup.
2 The driving factor in these models is the assumption of a costly refereeing process, resulting in direct savings from any reduction in submission rates. In contrast, gatekeepers here are motivated purely by improvements in their match outcomes and as such the present analysis supplements, rather than restates, these previous findings. Moreover, by embedding these tradeoffs into a general equilibrium framework, I am able to identify an asymmetry which is consistent with the empirical observation that editorial delays are substantially longer at top journals.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 establishes the formal model and Section 3 identifies the unique equilibrium, which may or may not entail sorting failures depending on conditions specified in Section 4. Extending the model, Section 5 then analyzes gatekeeper behavior in this non-standard competitive environment. Section 6 highlights several applications of the model and discusses potential extensions motivated by their idiosyncrasies.
The Model
This paper studies a decentralized, two-sided matching market with heterogeneity on both sides and a common preference. What sets it apart from the classic setup is the strategic meeting technology 2 Oster (1980), Heintzelman and Nocetti (2009) and Salinas and Munch (2015) characterize the optimal submission strategies for academic authors. The decision problem they solve is identical to the one faced by individual experts in this paper. Leslie (2005) , Azar (2005 Azar ( , 2007 and Cotton (2013) discuss the possible benefits of long editorial decision times and monetary submission costs at a single journal. and the asymmetric information structure.
Formally, I consider a continuous time game where short-lived, impatient experts seek to broadcast their ideas. For expositional simplicity, I refer to an ex pert by the quality x ∈ X = [0, 1] of his idea. Each time interval dt, a mass dt of experts arrive according to distribution F . I assume that F is continuous with full support over the quality space X and admits a differentiable density f .
On the other side, let J denote the finite set of long-lived gatekeepers who control separate channels of influence. The size of gatekeeper j's sphere of influence, or her impact, is publicly known and denoted by the exogenous parameter γ j > 0.
3 Within her limited per-period capacity κ j ∈ [0, 1], a gatekeeper seeks to accept (and promote) the most worthwhile ideas. 4 Total capacity is insufficient for all proposals, j∈J κ j < 1, which rules out trivial situations where the least attractive gatekeeper summarily accepts all proposals.
I abstract away from any goodness-of-fit issues by assuming that guaranteed and instantaneous acceptance by gatekeeper j carries the same utility γ j for all experts. Although experts share this common preference, they do not behave in the same way because acceptance is neither guaranteed nor instantaneous. Indeed, while experts are perfectly aware of their own type, gatekeepers only observe a noisy signal σ of a proposer's quality, independently drawn from G(σ|x). For tractability, I assume G(·|x) has full support over a closed interval Σ ⊆ R and admits a density g(σ|x) that is differentiable in both arguments.
5 I assume that signals obey the strict monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), meaning that
g(σ|x) is increasing in the expert's type x for all signalsσ > σ. Generating this signal is a time-intensive but costless process, resulting in a nontrivial response time T j > 0, during which the expert cannot explore any other options. However, once reached, a gatekeeper's acceptance decision is final in the sense that the expert is prohibited from approaching the same gatekeeper again. Experts expire upon a successful match or after unsuccessfully exploring all options.
Since promotion decisions cannot be fully anticipated by experts and are costly in terms of wasted time, experts face the dilemma of wanting to be accepted by the most prestigious gatekeeper while trying to avoid lengthy rejection cycles. Formally, an expert arriving at time t and being accepted by gatekeeper j at time t + ∆t exits the game with utility e −r∆t γ j , where r > 0 is the common discount rate. For notational simplicity, when there is no ambiguity I sometimes refer to e −rTj as δ j . An expert chooses when to propose to an individual gatekeeper j, but then has to wait until he hears back T j units of time later. For some applications, it is more reasonable to interpret T j as an active time investment for establishing contact, attending meetings or customizing the product. In this case, a higher discount rate reflects the increased opportunity cost.
I want to focus on the situation where expert history is private, and thus need to shut down 3 In Section 6, I discuss an extension where impact is endogenously determined. 4 The qualitative results carry over if gatekeepers' cardinal utility ranking is different -as long as they all share the same ordinal preference which is strictly increasing in x, even the worst expert is weekly better than a vacancy and exceeding capacity is costly enough to discourage additional matches even with the most attractive expert x = 1. For simplicity, I henceforth assume that the utility from accepting expert x is exactly equal to x.
5 It would be without loss of generality to map signals to the unit interval, but allowing for standard exponential signals simplifies exposition later on.
Before time begins, gatekeepers simultaneously set a j : Σ → [0, 1].
x Expert x proposes to a gatekeeper in J. j Nature draws an independent signal σ ∼ G(· |x).
The proposal is accepted with probability a j (σ). Nature draws an independent signal σ ′ ∼ G(· |x).
The proposal is accepted with probability a j ′ (σ ′ ).
Utilities are realized and the expert exits the game. any inferences thereon that could be made from calendar time. 6 For that reason, I assume that gatekeepers can condition their acceptance strategy only on the observed signal a j :
where a j (σ) denotes the acceptance probability of a proposal with signal σ. Formally, I consider an extensive form game where gatekeepers simultaneously commit to time-invariant acceptance strategies before time begins, 7 and experts thereafter choose the timing of their individual proposals.
Time-invariance of the acceptance decision leads to two immediate simplifications: No impatient expert ever delays proposing to a new gatekeeper, and experts of quality x face the same tradeoffs irrespective of their arrival time. As a result, optimal expert behavior is characterized by a (possibly random) proposal order ψ x ∈ ∆Π(J), where a specific permutation ω = (ω 1 , ..., ω |J| ) ∈ Π(J)
represents the strategy of proposing first to gatekeeper ω 1 and moving on to ω k+1 as soon as the expert is rejected by ω k .
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Consequently, let α j (x) = Σ a j (σ)g(σ|x)dσ denote the (expected) acceptance rate among proposals of a specific quality. Under any pure proposal order ω, the fraction of experts x eventually 6 Apart from realism, this assumption greatly simplifies the inference problem for gatekeepers as the signal is now the sole base of inference on a specific expert's type. In contrast, if it were known that an expert has previously been rejected five times, the previously generated signals must have been rather unattractive. Thus, even if the most recent signal is very high, a gatekeeper has cause for suspicion. As gatekeepers incorporate this source of information, acceptances become less and less likely for later proposals, thereby impacting experts' optimization problem.
Even if history is private, any gatekeeper approached at t = 0 knows that she is an expert's first choice. 7 If gatekeepers are allowed to condition acceptance decisions on calendar time but future strategies are private, the time-invariant equilibrium I propose remains subgame perfect as long as off-equilibrium beliefs have everybody expect equilibrium play from that point forward. This new game may however give rise to additional time-variant equilibria.
8 To clarify, Figure 2 represents a sample history for a specific expert.
proposing to gatekeeper j is given by the cumulative rejection probability of all previous proposals,
where ω −1 (j) denotes j's position in permutation ω. For general proposal orders ψ, the proposal rate is given by the expectation π j (x) = ω∈Π(J) ψ x (ω)π j (x|ω). In turn, the realized match rate between gatekeeper j and experts x is equal to the product µ j (x) = α j (x)π j (x). Whenever I want to stress the dependence on a specific parameter ξ, I include it in the notation as µ j (x|ξ).
As a result, I can write an expert's payoff under any pure proposal order ω ∈ Π(J) as
which is the sum over his match rate µ j (x) with each gatekeeper j, multiplied by the instantaneous payoff γ j and discounted by the total delay of this specific match. On the other hand, gatekeeper j's per-unit total matches are given by M j (a j ) = X µ j x|(a j , a −j ) f (x)dx, yielding her a total match value of
In addition, gatekeeper j faces a unit penalty of K > 1 on any flow rate in excess of κ j , bringing
Consequently, a (subgame perfect) equilibrium of the game (γ j , T j , κ j ) j∈J , {G(·|x)} x∈X , F specifies an acceptance strategy a j : Σ → [0, 1] for each gatekeeper j and a contingent proposal
for each expert x, such that (i) For each vector of acceptance strategies a = (a j ) j∈J , the proposal order ψ x (a) maximizes the payoff of expert x, meaning U (ω|x, a) ≥ U (ω |x, a) for any ω, ω ∈ Π(J) with ψ x (a)(ω) > 0.
(ii) The acceptance strategy a j maximizes the payoff for gatekeeper j, meaning
3 Equilibrium Analysis
Expert behavior
Experts are only indirectly competing with each other through their impact on gatekeeper capacity, but face independent decision problems conditional on gatekeepers' acceptance strategies. This 9 This flexible way to introduce capacity constraints has been used previously by, e.g. Che and Koh (2015) .
simplifies equilibrium analysis, as it is sufficient to analyze an isolated expert with given acceptance chances α j (x) at each gatekeeper j. Indeed, a close look at Equation (1) reveals that those are the only ingredients that determine his payoff U (ω|x).
Decomposing the payoff into the individual proposals, one observes that the expected utility of submitting to gatekeeper j is history dependent: While high-prestige options remain, it is a bad move to approach a low-impact gatekeeper with almost certain acceptance since that may cost the possibility of reaching for the most attractive channel. Similarly, a lengthy response time is particularly costly when multiple other venues have to be delayed. Fortunately, the underlying preference ordering is more straightforward, and it is possible to reformulate experts' payoffs to get rid of that history dependence while preserving their strategic behavior. This observation has previously been made by Heintzelman and Nocetti (2009) , who study the expert's decision problem in a partial equilibrium framework. I offer an independent proof in the appendix.
Lemma 3.1. Let
Then expert x's optimal proposal order is according to decreasing z j (α j (x)) score.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Intuitively, the z j score captures both the expected discounted benefit e −rTj α j γ j from an isolated proposal to j as well as the externality imposed from delaying any further proposals by T j in the case of rejection, which happens with probability 1 − α j . Consequently, high impact makes a gatekeeper more attractive but doesn't affect the externality, while fast response times or high acceptance rates both increase the value of a proposal and decrease its externality. The simplification pins down which proposal rates can occur in equilibrium and how these are affected by changes in external parameters.
Corollary 3.2. Proposal rates π j (x) are nondecreasing in α j (x) and γ j and nonincreasing in T j in the sense that any feasible π j (x) is weakly lower than all feasibleπ j (x) under α j (x) ≤α j (x), γ j ≤γ j or T j ≥T j . Changes in opponent parameters have the opposite effect: π j (x) is nonincreasing in α k (x) and γ k and nondecreasing in T k for all k = j.
The dependence of π j (x) on external parameters is entirely driven by their impact on the relative z j scores. For that reason, one game parameter is conspicuously absent from Corollary 3.2: the overall discount factor r. Since changes in expert impatience affect all z j -scores simultaneously, changes in this parameter can attract more proposals from experts at one end of the quality spectrum and reduce those from the other end.
Finally, each expert eventually exhausts all options, and exits the game unmatched if and only if all gatekeepers reject his proposals. Since both the individual signal draws σ and the acceptance probabilities a j (σ) are history-independent, changes in an expert's proposal order have no bearing on his overall match probability.
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Observation 1. The overall match probability for a given expert is independent of proposal order and equal to 1 − j∈J (1 − α j (x)).
It is thanks to this property that equilibrium uniqueness can be established in Theorem 1.
Gatekeeper behavior
Having thus characterized experts' best responses for any vector of gatekeepers acceptance strategies, it follows that gatekeepers optimally employ cutoff strategies in the first stage.
11
Lemma 3.3. In any equilibrium under private expert history, gatekeepers employ cutoff rules. More formally, the optimal strategy a j : Σ → [0, 1] of gatekeeper j is equivalent to a cutoff strategy in the sense that there exists a cutoff σ j ∈ Σ such that
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
This result is nontrivial because gatekeepers move first and as such have to internalize the indirect effect of their acceptance decision on the experts' behavior. 12 However, since proposal rates are nondecreasing in α j (x), they actually act as an amplifier -and any acceptance strategy that favors high-quality ideas (which the cutoff rule does best) has a doubly positive impact on the match distribution.
13
An important assumption of the model is that no proposals are of negative quality. In equilibrium, each gatekeeper thus either exhausts her capacity, M j = X µ j (x)f (x)dx = κ j , or accepts all 10 This would be true even if one adds a small monetary cost c j > 0 to each option, as an expert would only ever pursue gatekeeper j if and only if δ j γ j α j ≥ c j . As such, the set of proposals is still independent of the order.
11 Incidentally, it is due to this result that only the ordinal preference of a gatekeeper matters. The proof of Lemma 3.3 does not depend on any specific utility function and hence cutoff strategies are generally optimal. If in addition even the worst idea is preferred over a vacancy, the capacity constraint uniquely pins down a gatekeeper's best response.
12 Under simultaneous proposals (Chade et al., 2014) , this observation follows more easily since experts always match with the best acceptance offer they receive. Moreover, since proposals are made prior to the gatekeeper's decision, she doesn't incorporate the impact of her acceptance strategy onto the distribution of proposals she receives.
13 As a corollary from this observation, the basic model maintains whether or not experts observe gatekeeper decisions. Indeed, if gatekeeper strategies are private, a deviation is not detected by experts and the amplifying effect of π j (x) is absent. Still, cutoffs favor high-quality proposals, and hence the equilibrium analysis remains valid. However, as soon as I turn to more interesting strategic considerations such as red tape in Section 5.1, the observability of gatekeeper strategies becomes crucial.
proposals, σ j = min Σ.
14 However, since joint capacity is insufficient and overall match probability is independent of proposal order, the latter does not occur in equilibrium.
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Lemma 3.4. In any equilibrium, σ j ∈ int(Σ) for each j ∈ J, and hence all gatekeepers fill capacity in equilibrium.
Proof. Certain acceptance by even a single gatekeeper implies that no expert remains unmatched (see Observation 1), creating a contradiction with the model's assumption that j∈J κ j < 1.
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Categorical rejection σ j = max Σ on the other hand violates optimality since all matches are beneficial to the gatekeeper, and a high enough interior cutoff creates strictly positive value while respecting capacity.
Equilibrium Characterization
Based on the previous characterization of agent's best response, it follows that the game admits an essentially unique equilibrium. More specifically, gatekeeper cutoffs are uniquely determined, while indifferent experts may split in a number of ways, as long as total matches are maintained for each gatekeeper. This indeterminacy is inconsequential when only an F -measure zero of experts is indifferent across submission orders, as is true for exponential signals under arbitrary cutoffs (see Lemma A.2 in the appendix). In such a case, the game can be analyzed in reduced form as a simultaneous game between gatekeepers, admitting the succinct proof given here. I complete this proof in the appendix for general signal functions.
Theorem 1. An equilibrium exists. Moreover, gatekeeper cutoffs are uniquely determined and vary continuously in all external parameters.
Partial proof. To distill the main ideas, I here assume that the optimal submission order is unique for almost all experts under any cutoffs σ ∈ Σ, which in turn unambiguously determines proposal rates π j (x|σ) and total matches M j (σ). An extension to general signal functions is relegated to Appendix A.3, as is the discussion of continuity.
Part I: Best responses are monotone.
Total matches for gatekeeper j are unambiguously given by the function
By continuity of the z scores and the signal distribution G, this function is continuous. Moreover, both acceptance and proposal rates are decreasing in σ j , while the latter is weakly increasing in σ −j by Corollary 3.2. In other words, total matches are strictly decreasing in σ j and weakly increasing in σ −j . As a consequence, the best response function Φ :
Capacity manipulation is not beneficial since the match rate is increasing in σ j at every quality level x. This rules out situations as in Sönmez (1997) where match participants can increase matches with higher types by underreporting capacity. 15 The assumption of nonnegative quality can be relaxed in a situation where total capacity is far smaller than the inflow of worthwhile proposals, as long as all gatekeepers still fill capacity in equilibrium.
16 In a model with small enough monetary cost c j < δ j γ j , the same argument goes through.
is monotone over the complete lattice (Σ J , ≤).
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Part II: Φ has a unique fixed point.
By Tarski's fixed point theorem, the fixed points of Φ thus also form a nonempty and complete lattice along with the partial order ≤. Any such fixed point represents an equilibrium of the game when accompanied by any proposal orders that follow the z j (x) scores.
Finally, by Observation 1, the overall match probability for expert x is equal to 1− j∈J G(σ j |x).
As such, any two distinct ordered fixed points σ < σ differ in the total flow of matches
However, since that sum equals total capacity j κ j by Lemma 3.4, equilibrium is unique.
The previous theorem relies on the strategic complementarity among gatekeepers. The intuition for this is twofold: As an expert's acceptance rate at a competing gatekeeper k decreases, so does his z k score and he might now propose to gatekeeper j earlier. In addition, even conditional on proposal order, the expert proposes to j more often since his previous proposals are now more likely rejected. To counter her surge in proposals, gatekeeper j therefore also accepts fewer signals.
Equilibrium existence follows from Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem. Uniqueness on the other hand follows from the fact higher signals lower total matches irrespective of experts' proposal orders.
Unfortunately, the proof gets more involved when a nontrivial mass of experts may be indifferent across proposal orders. The indeterminacy of π j (x) in this case doesn't allow a reduced form discussion of the form above. In Appendix A.3, I instead approximate the z j scores by appropriately chosen step functions z n j that preclude expert indifference. Letting σ denote the limit of the respective equilibrium cutoffs, I then construct expert strategies that implement σ as equilibrium cutoffs.
The delicacy of this part lies in the fact that expert strategies are defined over an uncountable set X and may not converge pointwise. To circumvent this issue, I let all experts with identical limiting preference adopt the same mixed proposal strategy in a way that maintains gatekeepers' total matches. While the individual expert strategies are no longer best responses to the perturbed scores z n j , they admit a convergent subsequence by Bolzano-Weierstrass 18 and the limit represents a best response under score z and cutoffs σ. Intuitively, any strict preference is robust to small enough perturbations, and any proposal order is optimal under exact indifference.
Uniqueness follows from a generalization of Observation 1: Any two distinct gatekeeper cutoffs σ =σ (not necessarily ordered) differ in total matches for a subset of gatekeepers (Lemma A.3). Lastly, I consider any convergent parameter sequence ξ n → ξ and let σ n and σ denote the corresponding equilibrium cutoffs. The limit of any convergent subsequence s = lim k→∞ σ n k can 17 In the case of an unbounded signal space, a complete lattice is obtained by replacing Σ withΣ = [inf Σ, sup Σ] ⊆ R ∪ {±∞}. Continuity of M j (σ) and Lemma 3.4 ensure that all fixed points are interior.
18 Indeed, since all experts with the same limit preference behave in the same way, this reduces the number of strategies to at most |J| 2 (the number of weak orders over J). Response times are nine months each and the yearly discount rate is r = 10%. Ex-ante quality and signals are distributed exponentially, x ∼ exp(1) and σ|x ∼ exp(1/x). Equilibrium cutoffs are σ 1 = 5 and σ 2 = 2. As in the empirical findings, 75% of published papers are first intents.
be implemented as an equilibrium under ξ by the argument above. By uniqueness, this implies s = σ, and convergence follows since a bounded sequence with a unique subsequence limit is itself convergent. This completes the proof of continuity.
To illustrate how this formal framework may sharpen our understanding of such matching markets, let me reconsider an empirical study originally published in Science and give an alternative explanation for one of their main empirical puzzles. Calcagno et al. (2012) study flows of research manuscripts among journals by surveying successful authors where their published paper had previously been submitted. They observe two empirical regularities: First, among papers that were first rejected by one journal and then published at another journal (here called 'resubmissions'), most -but not all -ended up at a lower-impact journal than where they were first submitted to. Second, authors generally target journals efficiently, in the sense that 75% of all publications were first submitted to the journal that ultimately published them ('first-intents'). Together, these two observations lead them to expect that high-impact journals primarily publish first-intents, while lower journals receive and publish more resubmissions. Unexpectedly, they find the opposite pattern: the proportion of first-intent publications decreases with impact factor, except at the very top. To make sense of these findings, the authors suggest that top journals have a denser competitive neighborhood due to their general focus, and as such receive resubmissions from more sources.
However, instead of citing network effects, those findings can also be reconciled parsimoniously within the current model. Figure 3 lists the relevant parameter values and illustrates key equilibrium predictions. Intuitively, consider that the high-ranked journal has a small capacity, and the bulk of papers are of relatively low quality. Given their meager acceptance chances, most experts first submit to the bottom journal, are rejected and thereafter submit to the top. As a result, the top journal receives many more resubmissions than first-intents. So many in fact, that despite her high equilibrium cutoff, she ultimately publishes quite a few recycled papers. Conversely, only the very best papers are first submitted to the top, and in turn there is a small absolute number of papers that are first rejected at the top and then accepted at the bottom journal.
Put differently, the third finding may owe to averaging effects: In absolute numbers, the top journal publishes fewer resubmissions than the bottom, 19 but since its capacity is small in comparison, those make up a larger percentage of total publications in Figure 3c .
In the next two sections, I discuss equilibrium sorting and analyze the nonstandard competitive environment among gatekeepers. To do so, I restrict attention to the case of just two gatekeepers for tractability. In particular, this restriction ensures that the effect of an exogenous parameter change on equilibrium cutoffs is unambiguous and intuitive.
Lemma 3.5. With only two gatekeepers, a raise in γ j or a drop in T j causes a raise in gatekeeper j's cutoff and a drop in her opponent's cutoff. The changes are strict if there exists at least one indifferent interior expertx ∈ (0, 1) with
Proof. See Appendix B.
In the interest of brevity, the remaining comparative statics results are relegated to Appendix B.
Sorting Failures
A naive interpretation of the common preference assumption may suggest assortative matching, at least under some weakened notion that accounts for partial information. After all, all gatekeepers rank experts by proposal quality x, and any expert with certain acceptance everywhere ranks gatekeepers according to the present discounted value of future impact z j (1) = e −rTj γ j , which I refer to as a gatekeeper's appeal.
In particular, two natural properties for equilibrium sorting come to mind:
(i) More appealing gatekeepers should be more selective than their less appealing counterparts.
(ii) Only the best experts should propose first to the top gatekeeper.
As the following result shows, both monotonicity properties can fail in equilibrium: A gatekeeper might set a higher cutoff than a more appealing competitor. Conversely, experts with particularly poor acceptance rates everywhere have a low opportunity cost of waiting and therefore are less responsive to differences in response times. As a result, they might directly propose to the top gatekeeper even when more qualified experts first go after a faster, low-impact gatekeeper.
Theorem 2. Consider a setup with two gatekeepers, such that e −rT1 γ 1 > e −rT2 γ 2 .
(i) If the bottom gatekeeper is small (large) enough relative to the top, she is also more selective (accepting) in the sense that σ 2 > σ 1 (σ 2 < σ 1 ).
Moreover, for any capacity k 2 ∈ (0, 1), there exists an upper bound k 1 ∈ (0, 1 − k 2 ) such that equilibrium cutoffs are monotone whenever the top gatekeeper is small enough κ 1 < k 1 , and these bounds are independent of the parameters (T j , γ j ).
(ii) If the bottom gatekeeper responds much faster than at the top, such that δ 2 > γ1 δ1γ1+(1−δ1)γ2 δ 1 , there exists a MLRP signal function and capacities (κ 1 , κ 2 ) such that experts behave nonmonotonically in equilibrium, i.e. z 1 (x) > z 2 (x) and z 1 (x ) < z 2 (x ) for some x < x . This nonmonotonic behavior is ruled out when the low-impact gatekeeper γ 2 < γ 1 is not too much faster or sets a lower equilibrium cutoff.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
It is intuitive that a gatekeeper of disappearing capacity will set a high cutoff independent of her competitive position, and that this eventually upsets the first type of equilibrium sorting. However, the following example illustrates that gatekeepers may behave nonmonotonically even when they are of equal capacity.
Example 3. Consider a setup with two gatekeepers of equal capacity, (γ 1 , τ 1 , κ 1 ) = (1.18, 2, 0.2), (γ 2 , τ 2 , κ 2 ) = (1, 1, 0.2) and discount rate r = 10%. Signals are distributed exponentially, G(σ|x) = 1 − x σ . Expert quality is distributed with density f (x, λ) = (λ + 1)(1 − x) λ , where λ > 0 measures the concentration of expert quality. The distribution converges to a point mass at 0 as λ → ∞ and to the standard uniform distribution as λ → 0. For this example, fix λ = 3.
In equilibrium, gatekeepers behave nonmonotonically since σ 1 = 0.82 < 0.87 = σ 2 . Intuitively, experts apply first to the bottom gatekeeper if and only if x ≤x = 0.44, but due to the steep decrease of quality, this represents 90.3% of all experts. In order to counteract this high proposal rate, the bottom gatekeeper needs to be more selective than the top.
Experts as well may violate the natural sorting when facing a fast and selective bottom gatekeeper against a slow but more accepting top gatekeeper. In this comparison, only the fast turnaround time speaks for the bottom gatekeeper -she accepts fewer proposals and yields a lower payoff upon acceptance. Her quick decision increases the expected proposal payoff for all agents by the same factor, but the externality reduction on the delayed top proposal is most pronounced when rejection at the bottom and acceptance at the top is a likely outcome.
20 As the following example illustrates, 'average' experts may then first choose this low-yield, low-externality option, while the best and worst experts first pursue the top gatekeeper -the best being motivated by high success rates and the worst by a low opportunity cost of time.
21
Example 4. Consider a situation with two gatekeepers (γ 1 , τ 1 , κ 1 ) = (1.12, 2, 0.30), (γ 2 , τ 2 , κ 2 ) =
(1, 1, 0.27) and discount rate r = 10%. Signals and quality are distributed as before, with λ = 0.27. In equilibrium, the bottom gatekeeper is more selective than the top (σ 1 = 1 < 1.3 = σ 2 ) which causes experts to behave nonmonotonically. Specifically, experts first propose to the bottom gatekeeper if and only if x ∈ [0.17, 0.79], while both lower-and higher-quality experts first propose to the top. Figure 4 depicts the corresponding equilibrium.
These sorting failures show that monotone equilibrium behavior is not the 'default outcome'.
As such, crude inferences from a gatekeeper's rejection rate to her innate appeal may be faulty, as may those from an expert's proposal order to his quality. Neither are they a mere artifact of the exogenous impact parameter. To illustrate this, the examples in this section are chosen such that the endogenous mean quality of matches at either gatekeeper is proportional to the exogenous impact ratio γ 1 /γ 2 . In other words, if gatekeepers act as signaling devices for expert quality, then the relative value for an expert to be matched with gatekeeper j is exactly equal to the assumed impact γ j .
Furthermore, while both of these sorting failures also occur under simultaneous proposals (Chade et al., 2014) , the necessary and sufficient conditions are different for both cases. In a simultaneous setup, sorting failures occur independently for experts and gatekeepers, while they here occur among experts only if gatekeepers also set nonmonotone cutoffs. The latter however is more frequent now:
Example 3 shows nonmonotone gatekeeper behavior under equal capacities, which for simultaneous proposals is restricted to cases where κ 2 is significantly smaller than κ 1 . 22 In Appendix A.4, I
further show a third type of sorting failure that is unique to sequential proposals: Even under monotone equilibrium behavior, some low-quality experts may match more frequently with the top gatekeeper than experts of higher quality.
Gatekeeper Competition
Experts' directed search generates a non-standard competitive environment for gatekeepers. However, gatekeepers' only worry so far is to ensure that they meet their capacity limit, and as such 21 The actual proof is more mechanical: I consider the secant slopes of the indifference curve and identify necessary and sufficient conditions under which they move in the same direction. When they do, I derive a signal structure that ensures multiple crossings between indifference and acceptance curve. When they do not, the double secant property (Chade et al., 2014 , Theorem 1) guarantees a single crossing, and thereby monotone proposal strategies.
22 The proof mechanics are also more subtle under sequential proposals since the top gatekeeper is less shielded from cutoff decisions at the bottom: In the simultaneous setup, experts first make any number of proposals, based on which gatekeepers make match offers that are finally accepted or rejected by experts. Although each expert can only accept a single offer, all experts prefer being matched with the top gatekeeper. As such, and conditional on expert proposals, changes in the bottom's offer strategy have no bearing on the proposals received by the top nor on the acceptances of offers made. In a sequential world, this isolation breaks down; for even conditional on experts' proposal order, acceptance changes at the bottom directly affect how many experts will make further proposals. the base model fails to incorporate realistic and subtle strategic tradeoffs. For that reason, I now restrict attention to monotone equilibria and expand the model to a richer strategy space.
Red Tape
Among the real-world choices of gatekeepers are various considerations that determine their attractiveness in the eyes of experts: Ease of access, regulatory hurdles, customization requirements or response times. I study one such consideration by allowing gatekeepers some freedom in choosing their turnaround times T j . In particular, I assume that there exists an exogenously given minimal response time τ j , but a gatekeeper can costlessly set any longer response time T j ≥ τ j . 23 I am interested in knowing whether gatekeepers ever choose to set unnecessarily long T j > τ j . When they do, I refer to such spurious delay as red tape, a term that generically describes 'seemingly unnecessary tasks or actions that are required in order to get something.' 24 Indeed, while adding red tape may seem purely wasteful at first sight, it may actually benefit the infinitely patient gatekeeper j by nudging experts towards strategies that improve her proposal distribution. Endogenizing response times in this way does not upset equilibrium uniqueness and as such allows clear predictions regarding the presence and amount of red tape under monotone strategies.
Most importantly, the competitive environment between gatekeepers creates an asymmetry where the bottom gatekeeper always minimizes turnaround times in equilibrium, while the top chooses a strictly positive amount of red tape when the impact differential γ 1 − γ 2 is sufficiently large.
Theorem 3. Consider a setup with two gatekeepers who can add arbitrary red tape in the form of 23 Certainly, assuming an exogenous lower bound on response times is still a rather coarse assumption. Reality may be better described by a decreasing cost function that captures the organizational challenges to speeding up proposal evaluations. The lower-bound assumption corresponds to a situation where costs for T j < τ j exceed the maximal gatekeeper payoff of one, and drop to zero thereafter. Any additional cost reductions beyond τ j only make longer response times even more attractive in the eyes of the gatekeeper. One advantage of the lower-bound assumption is that it allows me to clearly identify excessive delay as T j > τ j . 24 According to "Definition of Red Tape", Merriam-Webster, accessed October 02, 2015, www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/red%20tape. delayed turnaround, T j ≥ τ j . Label gatekeepers such that the 'top' gatekeeper 1 is more attractive in the absence of red tape, e −rτ1 γ 1 ≥ e −rτ2 γ 2 .
If κ 1 is sufficiently small, an unique equilibrium exists. There is no red tape at the bottom, T 2 = τ 2 and the optimal response time T * 1 at the top is increasing in γ 1 and unbounded. The equilibrium thus exhibits red tape at the top T * 1 > τ 1 under sufficiently high impact γ 1 .
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
To illustrate the central proof ideas, consider a marginal increase in red tape dT j > 0 accompanied by a capacity-preserving cutoff reduction dσ j < 0. Any strict expert preference z 1 (α(x|σ 1 )) ≷ z 2 (α(x|σ 2 )) is maintained after this marginal change, implying that the proposal rate π j (x) remains unaltered for all but the marginal expertx. Pointwise higher acceptance rates through the cutoff decrease thus imply a higher match rate dµ j (x) = g(σ j |x)π j (x) for all x =x.
To maintain j's total matches M j , the marginal expertx thus has to propose strictly less often, so that the net effect for j is a substitution away from matches withx towards matches with other experts x =x. The net impact on her payoff is proportional to
where x −x is the payoff difference between matches with x andx, which are substituted at rate
The deviation is thus profitable if and only ifx is low enough. Up until this point, there is no difference across the two gatekeepers, and the analysis thus shows that even the bottom gatekeeper's best response involves red tape in off-equilibrium situations. An asymmetry arises however from experts' proposal behavior and the monotone equilibrium assumption: Since π 1 (x) ≥ π 2 (x) if and only if x ≥x, the top gatekeeper receives more (less) proposals with a positive (negative) quality difference x −x. Moreover, the monotone equilibrium cutoffs 25 σ 2 < σ 1 together with MLRP imply that g(σ 2 |x) is 'dominated' by g(σ 1 |x), loosely speaking. In other words, even if the bottom gatekeeper faced the same proposal rates π 1 (x) as the top, additional red tape would be less profitable for her. Together, the two arguments imply that unless Equation (2) is negative for the bottom gatekeeper (she wants to reduce delay),x is low enough that the top gatekeeper actually wants to further increase red tape. This of course rules out red tape at the bottom in equilibrium.
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The proof also highlights the top gatekeeper's rationale for adding red tape. Indeed, as in any filtering problem, noisy quality perception causes her to balance two types of mistakes: Accepting low-quality proposals and rejecting high-quality ones. In a situation where almost everyone first proposes to the top gatekeeper (which occurs as γ 1 grows), a combination of red tape and cutoff adjustment can reduce both error types; red tape reduces low-quality proposals while the cutoff drop increases acceptance everywhere. Since matches are jointly determined by proposal and the acceptance rate, red tape allows the gatekeeper to reduce matches with low-quality experts in favor of those with higher quality.
However, while discouraging early proposals through red tape reduces the inflow of proposals, their distribution is now adversely selected. Indeed, the top gatekeeper now hears only from previously rejected experts, implying that proposal rates have gone down over some range x ∈ [x,x], but the change ∆π j (x) < 0 is increasing in quality x. Naturally, this limits the attractiveness of delay as red tape. The problem of adverse selection can be partially avoided for other forms of red tape, such as a purely wasteful monetary cost c j that is due upon proposal and destroyed thereafter. In contrast to delay, the lowest-quality experts with acceptance rates below e rTj c j /γ j now refrain from proposing altogether. Similar to delay however, such red tape also affects the optimal proposal order of higher-quality experts, 27 and as such reduces proposals both from the very bottom and from the marginal expertx. Adverse selection only affects the latter reduction and consequently, gatekeepers generically prefer monetary proposal costs to delay, 28 as long as they can ensure that proposal costs are borne privately by the individual expert. At least within academic publishing however, long time lags are more frequent than submission fees, presumably due to the fact that experts are often reimbursed for any monetary costs. In other applications, such as political lobbying, ethical reasons preclude (or at least discourage) monetary fees: Politicians have to expect serious scrutiny if it becomes known that they demand payments before even considering their constituents' concerns.
Both of these reasons motivate my primary focus on delays rather than fees.
The main takeaway of Theorem 3 is that unnecessarily long delays may occur precisely because gatekeepers are competing with each other for experts' proposals. Extending the basic intuition beyond the formal two-gatekeeper case, the result seems to suggest that delays are particularly long among high-ranked gatekeepers. Empirical data from economic journals reported in Table 1 indeed exhibits high correlation between impact factor and first response time. A similar effect is reported by Ellison (2002) who analyses determinants for the slow-down in economic publishing and attributes most weight to the negative link between review speed and journal rank.
Although red tape may be beneficial to the top gatekeeper, I have yet to consider its externality on the other agents. Impatient experts are now facing longer match delays, and the competitive 27 Heintzelman and Nocetti (2009) include such a monetary cost in their analysis and show that the scores assigned to gatekeepers are now given by
28 Intuitively, there always exists a profitable, capacity-preserving deviation dc j > 0, dT j < 0 and dσ j < 0 that maintainsx as the indifferent expert and replaces some of the worst proposals with higher-quality matches. This generalizes Heintzelman and Nocetti (2009)'s observation by incorporating gatekeepers' capacity concern.
29 I use response times reported in Azar (2007) , restricting my sample to economic journals and ignore the four journals in accounting and finance, mainly because finance journals distinguish themselves through high submission fees. For some journals, the author lists both mean and median first response times over several subsamples of all publications (e.g. rejections only, revisions only). To avoid oversampling individual journals based on data availability, I restrict myself to the mean first response time for first submissions only, or the closest report thereof.
I There is a highly significant positive relationship between a journal's impact factor and editorial delays (p-value 0.16%), once the obvious outlier representing the Quarterly Journal of Economics × is removed. The coefficient remains positive but loses its significance when the outlier is included.
gain by the top gatekeeper may lower the bottom gatekeeper's payoff. As it turns out however, equilibrium effects are more subtle: A red tape equilibrium is accompanied by cutoff adjustments that may actually increase payoff for those experts who value easier access to the top above a fast response. Similarly, the bottom gatekeeper now matches more frequently with experts close tox with an ambiguous impact on his payoff.
Since red tape equilibria are not Pareto ordered, I consider the alternative welfare measure of social impact
True to the modeling framework, this notion assumes that ideas promoted by gatekeeper j attain an impact of γ j , fixing the social value of an x-j match to xγ j . In other words, it is socially more efficient that the best ideas be promoted through the most influential channels.
As Theorem 4 hereafter shows, red tape can actually help to achieve this goal by incentivizing experts to sort more efficiently. Intuitively, if the more influential gatekeeper responds too quickly, she becomes flooded with proposals and consequently has to set an extremely high signal cutoff.
Red tape diverts some low-quality proposals to the bottom gatekeeper, allowing both of them to employ more similar cutoffs. For signal distributions satisfying the strong monotone likelihood ratio property
this improves the overall quality distribution of matched experts µ 1 (x) + µ 2 (x) in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Lemma A.8 in the appendix establishes this property for any exponential signal distributions. In this case, red tape simultaneously improves the mean quality of experts matched with the top gatekeeper as well as the total quality of matched experts, and as such necessarily improves social impact.
Theorem 4. Consider a setup with two gatekeepers such that γ 1 > γ 2 , with κ 1 sufficiently small compared to κ 2 so as to ensure monotone equilibrium strategies. If the signal distribution satisfies (sMLRP) and τ 1 is low enough, then some red tape is welfare-enhancing.
The welfare result in Theorem 4 implies that there exists a lower bound on the optimal response time T 1 . Whenever the minimal response time τ 1 lies below this bound, red tape is welfare enhancing. Admittedly, this bound partly depends on the second response time τ 2 , and as such the statement doesn't speak to the welfare impact of red tape under joint reductions in minimal response times. However, a closer look at the proof identifies red tape as beneficial exactly in situations where the marginal expertx is particularly low. In other words, red tape improves welfare if and only if the vast majority of experts first propose to the top gatekeeper, which occurs if the impact differential γ 1 − γ 2 is large, if experts are particularly patient or if response times are generally short. 30 As such, a stronger conclusion is warranted: Even if technological innovations drastically lower all minimal response times τ j , it is socially preferable that the top gatekeeper do not reduce delay as much as technically feasible. By keeping some red tape T 1 > τ 1 , she nudges the lowest quality experts towards the bottom gatekeeper first, thereby improving total match surplus.
Simultaneously, this analysis is also relevant to a market designer who controls gatekeepers' impact γ j . By way of example, committee membership in the senate is an important determinant of a politician's influence (McNollgast, 1994, p.18) . Ideally, the designer would like to appoint the gatekeeper with the highest-quality matches to a key position. However, shifting impact from gatekeeper 2 towards gatekeeper 1 upsets equilibrium sorting due to a surge in low-quality proposals.
Fortunately, red tape allows the designer to maintain equilibrium matches by ensuring that the two gatekeepers retain a similar score in the experts' eyes even as the actual impact differential grows.
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This observation runs contrary to popular wisdom, where red tape and aggregation of power is often 30 Indeed, z 1 (x) − z 2 (x) → ∞ as γ 1 − γ 2 → ∞, and z j (x) → γ j as either r → ∞ or T j → 0. Under any of these limits, all experts first propose to the top gatekeeper.
31 The appropriate increase in red tape maintains indifference for the marginal expertx, that is z 1 (x|γ 1 , T 1 ) = z 2 (x|γ 2 , T 2 ). In the present setup, the planners problem is only well-defined under either an upper bound on T 1 or a lower bound on γ 2 . This is because as γ 2 → 0, the marginal expert remains indifferent if and only if T 1 → ∞.
seen as a hallmark of corruption.
32 In the present setup instead, red tape is used as an allocation mechanism in the absence of price discrimination, and it may be valuable if the brunt of the delay is privately borne by experts and of minimal concern for welfare.
Indeed, by considering only the final match distribution, social impact (3) does not directly associate any cost to the slow-down of the match process incurred from red tape. As such, it does not incorporate the notion that experts' ideas may become obsolete before a match occurs. This is true of the model more generally, as I assume that expert quality x does not decline over time and exits are voluntary. Nevertheless, the result generalizes for a patient social planner with sufficiently low discount factor ρ > 0, since
where T 1 , T 2 (x) = (T 1 , T 1 + T 2 ) for x >x and T 1 , T 2 (x) = (T 1 + T 2 , T 2 ) for x <x measures the total delay incurred before match x − j is realized.
The role of editorial delays has been studied before in a partial equilibrium framework (Leslie, 2005; Azar, 2007; Heintzelman and Nocetti, 2009) , mostly with a focus on contrasting them to monetary submission costs.
33 Associating an explicit cost to refereeing (i.e. signal generation), these papers articulate why journals want to raise submission hurdles. However, the arguments presented here do not rely on reductions in refereeing load, and as such are in addition to the previously identified channels. Finally, since none of these previous models incorporates adjustments made by other journals, they do not allow welfare statements of the type considered here.
Second-tier Specialization
Another way in which actual gatekeepers set themselves apart is through horizontal differentiation, meaning that a gatekeeper caters primarily to a specific subset of the expert population. By way of example, academic journals often focus on a specific subdiscipline, even when the subject matter is not related to an article's quality per se.
To capture such tradeoffs, I here assume that incoming experts have an exogenous, qualityirrelevant type θ ∈ {A, B} and that gatekeepers can condition their acceptance decision on θ.
Specifically, I assume that in each time interval dt, an equal mass of experts of either type arrives, 32 Seminal papers in development economics identify two main channels: In Shleifer and Vishny (1993) , a central bureaucrat with monopoly power raises the official costs for services through red tape, and then charges bribes in exchange for lower access hurdles. In Banerjee (1997) , a corrupt official is tasked with the allocation of goods to cash-constrained buyers. The official has to allocate goods efficiently for fear of detection by the government. However, rather than identifying buyers' valuation through price discrimination, the official charges maximal fees and implements red tape as a sorting mechanism.
33 If such proposal fees are feasible, they represent a more efficient deterrent than red tape since they simultaneously delay proposals fromx and fully discourage proposals from the bottom end of the quality distribution. I here concentrate on situations where monetary payments are ruled out for ethical or fairness concerns, or do not serve as a deterrent for instance because submission costs are paid for directly by the department.
Baseline match distribution for top and bottom gatekeeper. Low quality experts x ≤x first propose to 2.
for the bottom gatekeeper with (solid line) and without specialization (dashed). The dotted line shows the quality density f (x). and common discount rate r = 10%. Signals are distributed exponentially, G(σ|x) = 1 − e −(1−x)σ , and the density function of expert quality is f (x) = 15
In the baseline scenario where experts only differ with respect to quality, the unique equilibrium with red tape is given by ((T 1 , σ 1 ), (T 2 , σ 2 )) = ((10.33, 2), (1, 1)). Figure 5a depicts the resulting match distribution of each gatekeeper.
When gatekeepers can condition their acceptance on expert type θ ∈ {A, B}, the bottom gatekeeper has a strict incentive to deviate from her previous strategy and instead specialize on an arbitrary target type. Figure 5b depicts the change in her match distribution if she instead sets her cutoffs at (σ A 2 , σ B 2 ) = (0.58, 1.58). By contrast, any specialization worsens the total match quality of the top gatekeeper.
The asymmetry among gatekeepers in the previous example has an intuitive explanation. Indeed, specialization affects a gatekeeper's match distribution through both a direct and an indirect effect.
The former is considering the impact of specialization conditional on experts proposal order and is always negative: When a gatekeeper specializes on type A, she starts accepting such proposals with signals below the prior cutoff σ j and instead rejects B-proposals with signals above σ j . The indirect effect however comes from changes in experts' proposal order: Her change in cutoffs raises the acceptance rate and hence the z j score for experts of type A, while lowering that of B types. As a result, the expert receives more first proposals in her target group and loses some in her nontarget group. By specializing, the bottom expert thus gains A proposals abovex and loses B proposals below, wherex denotes the indifferent expert in a monotone equilibrium. In contrast, when the top gatekeeper contemplates specialization, she expects to recruit any additional A proposals beloŵ x while losing B proposals above. Intuitively speaking, the bottom gatekeeper thus specializes whenever the positive indirect effect outweighs the negative direct effect. The top gatekeeper on the other side is affected negatively by both effects, and hence generally prefers to maintain a global signal cutoff.
Unfortunately, the intuition misses one technical aspect that complicates the formal analysis:
While the total matches are maintained by the capacity constraint, some direct gains might offset indirect losses or vice versa. For extreme cases, this may offset the negative conclusion reached above for gatekeeper 1, as illustrated by the next example.
Example 6.
Maintaining the baseline example from above, suppose the lower bound τ 1 = 1.5 on gatekeeper 1's response time is so high that she does not employ red tape. In this case, the top gatekeeper can improve her payoff by specializing, as illustrated in Figure 6 .
Intuitively, in this situation the value of Equation (2) is negative for the top gatekeeper, meaning that the marginal expertx = 0.8 is much higher than the mean qualityx lost by a raise in threshold.
Prehibited from reducing her response times, the top gatekeeper instead turns to specialization in order to replace some direct losses (aroundx) with indirect gains (aroundx).
In such a situation, the equilibrium presence of red tape comes in handy since it ensures that any marginal direct change is of equal mean quality as the marginal indirect change. This enables me to formally rule out deviations through specialization for the top gatekeeper.
Theorem 5.A. Assume that signals are distributed exponentially. Consider a monotone equilibrium σ 1 ≥ σ 2 where expert types θ ∈ {A, B} are unobservable and the top gatekeeper employs red tape, T 1 > τ 1 . Then as expert types become observable, the top gatekeeper cannot improve his payoff through specialization.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Since the bottom gatekeeper never employs red tape in equilibrium by Theorem 3, her marginal direct change may be of strictly lower quality than the marginal indirect change. Thus, to give a sufficient condition for a profitable specialization, one needs to ensure both that the direct effect is strong enough and that indirect net losses do not compensate direct net gains. Both are satisfied when there are many experts of indifferent quality (f (x) is high) and the slope of the density at that point is not too negative in comparison. Both conditions can be achieved without altering the tails of the quality distribution, and indeed are satisfied often for moderate values as highlights Example 5 above.
Theorem 5.B. Fix any monotone equilibrium (σ 1 , σ 2 ) with the possibility of red tape. Denote the equilibrium response times at the top by T 1 and the indifferent expert byx. Consider any sequence of ex-ante quality distributions F n and capacities (κ n 1 , κ n 2 ) such that the same gatekeeper cutoffs (σ 1 , σ 2 ) along with the response times (T 1 , τ 2 ) remain an equilibrium for each n. Suppose further that for any c > 0, there exists N ∈ N such that f n (x) > c and −(f n ) (x) < c · f n (x) 2 for all n ≥ N . In this case, the bottom gatekeeper can strictly improve her payoff through specialization for n large enough.
The second part of Theorem 5 has important implications for equilibrium behavior as well, for it gives sufficient conditions under which at least one gatekeeper specializes. However, although the top gatekeeper cannot benefit by unilaterally specializing, this does not mean she will not respond to a differential strategy by the bottom gatekeeper. For that reason, equilibria will generally involve mixing as illustrated below.
Example 5 (continued).
In the first example of this section, there exists an equilibrium with observable expert types θ ∈ {A, B} such that the bottom gatekeeper specializes with equal probability on either type (σ θ 2 , σβ 2 ) = (0.58, 1.60), while the top gatekeeper maintains an unique cutoff σ 1 = 2.01. Figure 7 illustrates the equilibrium match distributions for each gatekeeper.
Figure 7: An equilibrium with specialization at the bottom. Here, the bottom gatekeeper specializes on either type θ ∈ {A, B} with equal probability. The resulting match distributions in both the target and nontarget group are drawn in thin lines, with the mean in bold.
Ruling out equilibrium specialization for the top gatekeeper is unfortunately not generally possible. 34 Thus, while Theorem 5 identifies sufficient conditions for the endogenous emergence of specialization, it does not rule out specialization by both gatekeepers in equilibrium. What it does say, however, is that the first impetus for specialization always comes from the bottom gatekeeper, and never from the top.
Applications and Potential Extensions
By referring to the two sides of the market as experts and gatekeepers, I purposely adopt generic language to encompass a wide range of real-world instances.
A first instance of the framework is familiar to all academics and pertains to scientific publishing or grant applications. Authors (experts) are usually restricted from submitting their papers to multiple journals or grant agencies (gatekeepers) simultaneously 35 and wait several months until a publication decision is reached (Ellison, 2002) . I focus on noise in the refereeing process as the main informational friction, a phenomenon that has been documented by several empirical studies.
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As such, I abstract away from bias or noise in the author's personal assessment of a manuscript's quality and take journal impact as exogenous, 37 but I briefly explore how to incorporate either two-sided imperfect information or endogenous impact at the end of this section.
A second instance of the model concerns technology adoption, whereby inventors approach 34 The main reason for this is that any equilibrium now includes at least two marginal expertsx θ andxθ. As a result, the profitability of non-marginal deviations becomes dependent on the value of the quality density f (·) everywhere, among all other parameters.
35 For grant applications, the most common restrictions concern simultaneous submissions within the same agency, see for example "Frequently Asked Questions", National Science Foundation, accessed August 14th, 2015, http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/gpg/faqs.pdf.
36 See for example Bohannon (2013) ; Langfeldt (2001) ; Rothwell and Martyn (2000) ; Welch (2014) . 37 Two other notable features I abstract away from are reputation effects on the part of the scientist (each individual submission is evaluated on its own merit) and added value from the revision process. However, as long as the latter is positively correlated with a journal's ranking, it can partially be incorporated in the impact value. managers of big corporations in the hope of selling a product or technology, or venture capitalism where startups seek funding from investors. In both instances, the inventor is more familiar with the venture, and approaching potential customers or investors is taxing, both in terms of active time investment (search costs, customization, meetings) and passive delays while waiting to hear back from a potential partner. As search here is not necessarily exclusive, these models carry features of both simultaneous and sequential proposals. However, I argue hereafter that the pertinent features of such a setting are better captured by the present model than by a purely simultaneous setting as in Chade et al. (2014) .
Third, gatekeepers are also present in political debate: In an indirect democracy such as the United States or the United Kingdom, only elected officials can suggest new laws. Thus, any interest group wishing to draft a new bill needs to find an official willing to sponsor it. Simplifying reality, I assume the only disagreement about the social value of a specific proposal stems from imperfect knowledge, which is more pronounced on the side of the lawmaker. Lawmakers vary in their degree of political influence as determined by committee membership or their persuasion power.
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Finally, the model also offers insights with respect to high-end labor markets, where job applicants spend significant time preparing for each individual application, customizing their portfolio and sometimes even earning additional, industry-specific credentials.
As with any model, some of the assumptions made in this paper are rather stylized. The actual applications motivate several important extensions, some more tractable than others. Let me briefly consider some of them here:
First, I assume that a gatekeeper's impact is exogenously determined and not affected by the quality of her realized matches. In instances where γ j measures grant amounts or political persuasion power, that assumption is more easily accepted than in academic publishing for example, where journal impact is determined by the quality of prior publications.
39 To capture this feedback effect, the mean quality of matches seems to be an appropriate measure of influence, i.e.
Incorporating such a notion would give insight into new strategic considerations such as misrepresenting capacity and the extent of vertical differentiation. On the technical side however, the main downside to this approach is an indeterminacy brought about by multiplicity of subgame equilibria. Specifically, there can be several ways in which experts may respond to gatekeeper strategies which are not payoff equivalent. This creates issues when studying a gatekeepers strategic tradeoffs since he cannot anticipate whether a deviation would increase or decrease her payoff. To avoid this issue, in future work I plan to consider an 'overlapping-generation' framework where gatekeepers can choose different strategies for each generation of experts, but impacts are determined by the realized matches of the previous generation. Since experts now again face exogenous impact, their search behavior is uniquely determined (up to indifference in the z j -scores). On the other hand, this framework is rich enough to consider gatekeepers' long-term strategic positioning.
A second modeling assumption concerns the informational environment. By postulating onesided imperfect information, I assume that experts are perfectly informed about their own desirability. For grant applications, political ventures or the technological potential of startup firms, it seems reasonable to assume that experts are more adept judges of quality. In academic publishing however, opinions diverge on whether authors or reviewers see more clearly. Chade et al. (2014) make the important observation that a world with two-sided imperfect information is equivalent to one where gatekeepers draw affiliated signals. Intuitively, referring to the expert's signal 'x+noise' as his type, gatekeeper evaluation now has a common component '−noise'. Since experts now simultaneously learn about their true quality, the equivalence to a history-independent z j -score breaks down, and it seems necessary to reduce the analysis to just two gatekeepers for tractability. For that case however, it can be shown that conditional on marginal acceptance probabilities, more experts first approach the high-impact gatekeeper when more signals are more affiliated (more uncertainty is on the expert side) -leading one to expect that such situations exhibit more crowding at the top.
Intuitively, acceptance at the bottom is now bitter-sweet, since it simultaneously raises the expert's own quality estimate, which causes him to regret his low aim. Unfortunately, a meaningful comparison about equilibrium behavior is complicated by the fact that changes in relative noise have a heterogeneous effect on experts' marginal acceptance probabilities, and the extent depends largely on the specific cutoffs employed in equilibrium. All-in-all, while solving a specific two-gatekeeper game with two-sided asymmetric information seems tractable, it appears difficult to draw insightful equilibrium comparisons.
In this paper, I assume that match utilities are non-transferable throughout and equal to the quality or impact of one's match partner. While this is not an uncommon assumption, it fits some applications better than others. For venture capital, ownership negotiations are an integral part of the match process. As such, it may seem more suitable to assume that match surplus is determined jointly by a supermodular 40 function φ(x, γ j ) which can be split arbitrarily across the two match partners. Importantly however, if surplus is split according to exogenously determined shares (β, 1 − β) between experts and gatekeepers, 41 then the qualitative findings from this paper carry over, albeit under modified z j scores that take into account the new payoff structure,
Since experts' own quality now directly affects their payoff, they no longer share the same score 40 Supermodularity maintains assortative matching as the socially efficient outcome.
41 Such an split is obtained under Nash bargaining with threat points zero, which fits a situation where match decisions are made before surplus negotiations take place and any match dissolution implies foregone capacity for the gatekeeper and an immediate exit for the expert.
It also seems like an interesting and nontrivial extension to implement more general solutions of Nash bargaining, where the threat points are determined endogenously from continuation payoffs, which would need to go hand-in-hand with public history to ensure that everybody can correctly anticipate their match payoffs.
function -higher-quality experts are now even more eager to match quickly -but the qualitative reaction to parameter changes are maintained. Similarly, gatekeeper's cardinal preferences now differ, but they still seek to match with the highest-quality experts and as such the qualitative tradeoffs remain: red tape might still occur (possibly both at the top and the bottom) and by improving assortativity, it can still be welfare-improving.
In situations where experts can approach multiple gatekeepers simultaneously but proposals are costly, experts face a portfolio choice problem (Chade and Smith, 2006) . However, this doesn't imply that these applications are better described by the one-shot model in Chade et al. (2014) , for although experts are no longer restricted to a single proposal per moment of time, they are also not restricted to a single opportunity for proposals. Indeed, a defining feature of their college application model is that all proposals must be made simultaneously, and if an expert forgoes proposing to a specific gatekeeper j, he can no longer seek out j in case his other proposals don't work out. It is this possibility of regret that generates equilibrium multiplicity and thus prevents an unambiguous reduced-form discussion of gatekeeper competition.
42 Such a strict deadline is generally absent in grant applications, venture capitalism, technology adoption or political debate, where experts can pursue new options if the initial proposals don't work out. Therefore, while both models simplify reality for the sake of tractability, I argue that assuming a limit on the number of simultaneous rather than on the number of sequential proposals both better captures the essence of these problems and offers greater tractability benefits.
Lastly, one may care to relax the assumption of private expert history in situations, at least to the point of making arrival times public. Indeed, especially since the advent of internet technology, it is often possible to detect how long an idea has already circulated. To avoid inference issues, the model promises to actually be more tractable if the full proposal history is known rather than just the arrival time. 43 As acceptance histories become conditional on proposal history, experts' proposal order gets computationally more heavy, but a setup with just two gatekeepers seems tractable and insightful. It seems of particular policy interest to analyze how this impacts match delays. On one side, there is likely going to be an acceptance penalty for second submissions (due to previous low signal draw), forcing experts to target their first proposal more strategically. At the same time, this also raises the potential returns from proposing boldly, as the top gatekeeper becomes particularly optimistic about his first proposals.
42 Intuitively, consider a mediocre expert who proposes to both gatekeepers. As his acceptance rate at the top increases, his marginal benefit from a 'safety proposal' to the bottom gatekeeper decreases and he may limit himself to only proposing to the top gatekeeper. As such, although his acceptance rate weakly increases at both gatekeepers, the expert's equilibrium match probability goes down, contrary to the monotonicity resulting from Observation 1.
43 The latter may generate incentives for experts to wait idly in order to pool with those of a different proposal history. However, for the most tractable case of two gatekeepers, the two are equivalent since first proposals always happen right upon arrival.
Conclusion
This paper develops a model for sequential directed search in a two-sided matching market. The framework captures important tradeoffs that guide decisions in many areas including academic publishing, political decision-making, venture capitalism and grant allocations. Heterogeneous experts all seek to match with the most influential gatekeepers, but inherent quality differences endogenously create an endogenous distinction in their sensitivity to delay. In turn, the long-lived gatekeepers may exploit this aversion by using unnecessary delay or horizontal differentiation to influence experts' search decisions. Apart from these new findings, the main contribution of the paper is to provide a tractable equilibrium framework that speaks to a broad range of applications and offers exciting opportunities for future research.
A Additional Proofs
A.1 Proofs concerning Section 3.1
Proof of Lemma 3.1. For any j, k ∈ J and permutation ω over J ⊆ J \ {j, k}, simple algebra shows that U ((j, k, ω)) ≥ U ((k, j, ω)) can be rewritten as
Let ω * be an optimal permutation over J and assume by contradiction that there exists some
. By the previous argument,
and by the definition of U (·), this contradicts optimality of ω * .
Lemma A.1. Whenever experts are best responding, proposal rates π j (x) satisfy
where
)} for ∈ {≥, >} denotes upper contour sets according to the z j -score.
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Proof. The bounds obtain for the degenerate lotteries that place weight only on optimal permutations ω ∈ Π(J) where ω −1 (j) is maximal or minimal respectively.
Proof of Corollary 3.2. Rewriting
makes it apparent that ∂zj ∂αj > 0, ∂zj ∂γj ≥ 0 and ∂zj ∂Tj ≤ 0 with strict inequality for all α j > 0. (And since z k (α k ) = 0 if and only if α k = 0, the value π j (x) is uniquely determined and independent of γ j and T j even when α j (x) = 0.) Monotonicity follows from Lemma A.1 as a raise in z j <z j increases the upper contour sets in the sense that P > j ⊇ P ≥ j and hence π j ≤ k∈P
(1−α k ) ≤π j . Similarly, when another gatekeeper becomes more attractive throughα k ≥ α k ,
44 In line with convention, any product over the empty set is assumed to be one, i.e. k∈∅ * = 1 for any factor * .
A.2 Proofs concerning Section 3.2
Proof of Lemma 3.3. For any gatekeeper strategy a j : Σ → [0, 1], let σ j ∈ Σ denote the unique cutoff that leads to the same total match rate M j .
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Using the simple structure of the cutoff rule, the change in acceptance rate at x is given by
For any x > x, the monotone likelihood ratio property implies
This implies the single crossing property
By monotonicity of π j (·) in α j (x), the same holds for match rates µ j (x) = α j (x)π j (x). Since total matches are constant across the two, either the two policies are equal for almost all x, 46 or the value to gatekeeper j strictly improves under the cutoff strategy, as low-quality matches are replaced by more worthwhile ones.
A.3 Proofs concerning Section 3.3
Lemma A.2. Exponential signals G(σ|x) = 1 − e −φ(x)σ satisfy the MLRP for any decreasing parameter function φ : X → R + . Moreover, suppose no two gatekeepers have exactly the same impact, γ j = γ k for any j = k ∈ J. In that case, the set j =k∈J
has F -measure zero for any gatekeeper cutoffs σ ∈ Σ J .
Proof. MRLP follows immediately from the definition, since g(σ|x)/g(σ |x) = e −φ(x)(σ−σ ) is in- 45 The match rate µ j (x) is strictly decreasing in σ j by virtue of the strong monotonicity of G(·|x) and the weak monotonicity π j (x) in α j . While this establishes uniqueness, existence is not as straightforward: Indeed, the function π j (x|σ j ) contains discontinuities with respect to σ j . However, monotonicity still implies the existence of a decreasing and convergent sequence of cutoffs σ n j → σ j such that matches are below
The subsequent argument highlights that a deviation to a cutoff rule σ n j will eventually be profitable for large enough n. This rules out any other strategies as equilibrium candidates.
46 This happens only if a j (s j ) = 1σ j (s j ) for almost all signals s j .
creasing in x for any σ > σ . The exponential distribution also implies that acceptance rates relate to each other as α j = α σ j /σ k k for all experts x. By expanding the z score, one can rewrite the indifference condition
positive, implying that the Dirichlet polynomial has at most three real zeros (Jameson, 2006) .
Lemma A.3. Consider two interior cutoff vectors σ,σ ∈ int Σ J and let J < = j ∈ J |σ j < σ j .
Joint total matches over any nonempty J < strictly decrease for any feasible proposal rates π,π :
Proof. Fix any expert type x ∈ X and let α,α denote the vectors of marginal acceptance probabilities for expert x under cutoffs σ andσ respectively, and let z,z denote the corresponding scores.
Finally, consider any arbitrary pure optimal proposal order ω,ω ∈ Π(J).
The proof proceeds in three steps. First, I maintain the proposal order ω and update acceptance rates one-by-one, showing that the value of
weakly decreases in each round, and strictly for dimensions j ∈ J < . Indeed, µ < is weakly decreasing in the marginal acceptance rate for any k / ∈ J < , and by definition of J < ,α k ≥ α k . As for any
The first term is independent of α k and the square brackets contain a weighted sum over two terms.
In addition, note that
where the equality follows by the overall success rate of independent Bernoulli trials. For any interior cutoffs, the second term of the weighted sum is thus strictly below one, and hence as α j decreases to α j , weight is shifted towards the smaller term, strictly decreasing the value of µ < .
Second, having thus updated all acceptance rates (informally expressed as µ < ω >μ < ω ), I now swap neighboring elements of the proposal order until the permutation agrees withω. By the Bubblesort algorithm (Cormen, 2009) , such swaps need to be performed only over neighboring elements (j, k) that switch their relative order, i.e.
Moreover, any such swap only affects the match rate at gatekeepers j and k, leaving all others unchanged. It follows immediately that swaps over j, k / ∈ J < have no bearing on the value of µ < . Neither do
Finally, since z j >z j and z k ≤z k , any swap between the two elements must be such that j moves down in the proposal order, i.e.
The impact on µ < is therefore given by an additional factor (1 −α k ) < 1 in the jth term, which again weakly lowers its value.
Finally, since µ < ω >μ < ω ≥μ < ω for any feasible proposal orders, the inequality also holds over lotteries -and therefore j∈J < µ j (x) > j∈J <μj (x). By integrating over X, the desired result follows.
Complement to the proof of Theorem 1. In the main text, I assume that the measure of indifferent experts is zero for all signal cutoffs σ j ∈ Σ. This simplification uniquely pins down proposal rates and as such allows for the most crisp exposition of the proof details.
To establish general existence, consider step function scores z
, where z = max {n ∈ N | n ≤ z}. By adding the second term, I ensure that no expert is ever indifferent across submission orders, 47 yet the approximation is such that z n j → z j uniformly for all j. The proof outlined in the main text implies existence of an unique fixed point σ n ∈ Σ J . By Bolzano-Weierstrass, there exists a convergent subsequence σ n k → σ. I will now construct expert proposal rates that implement cutoffs σ as an equilibrium.
To do so, consider any weak order ⊂ J 2 and let
denote the set of experts whose z-score agrees with . Now for any x ∈ X , let ω n (x) denote the unique optimal proposal order under cutoffs σ n and score z n , and call the set of all such orders
This implies that the set of feasible total proposal rates is spanned by the convex hull of those resulting from ω n ∈ Ω n , and as such there exists a lottery over proposal orders n ∈ ∆Ω n such that total matches M (X ) are maintained even if all experts employ n . In doing this, I essentially ensure that all experts with the same (weak) limiting preference over gatekeepers employ the same strategy (which may however now involve mixing).
While this no longer describes a best response under (z n , σ n ), it is useful for the following two reasons:
• Since there are finitely many weak orders ⊆ J 2 , these orders partition the experts into at most |J| 2 sets, all of which employ the same strategy n (equal to a lottery over permutations 47 Indeed, nz n j only takes on values within N + j |J|+1
, and these sets are disjoint across gatekeepers. of J). By Bolzano-Weierstrass, there exists therefore a subsequence n k such that these expert strategies converge to some limiting . I will now establish that this limit describes a best response for all experts under score z and cutoffs σ. Since capacities are maintained by definition of n , they therefore establish equilibrium existence.
• To show that describes a best response under preference , I need to show that the probability of proposing to k prior to j is zero whenever k ≺ j.
To do so, let m ∈ N and consider the set of x ∈ X such that g(σ|x) ≤ m and
I refer to the set of all qualifying x as X m ⊆ X . Since the derivative of the z j score is bounded above by γ j (e rTj − 1) −1 and that of α(x|·) is bounded below by −m, there exists n m 0 ∈ N large enough (and independent of x) such that
Moreover, by uniform convergence of z n , there also exists n
In other words, for n large enough, all experts in X m propose first to gatekeeper j as a best response to (z n , σ n ). This limits the weight placed on any proposal order with
In particular, as m → ∞, this bound goes to zero and establishes the desired result.
As for uniqueness, consider by contradiction that σ =σ both describe equilibrium cutoffs. Up to relabeling, the set J < = j ∈ J |σ j < σ j is nonempty, and hence Lemma A.3 implies that total matches for j ∈ J < differ over the two cutoffs. This contradicts the equilibrium condition
As for continuity of total matches, consider any convergent parameter sequence
Let σ n , σ ∈ Σ J be the corresponding equilibrium cutoffs. By the same argument as above, there exists a convergent subsequence σ n k →σ along with proposal orders that implementσ as an equilibrium under (T, γ, κ). By Lemma A.3, the limit is uniqueσ = σ. Assume by contradiction that σ n doesn't converge. By definition, this implies that there exists ε > 0 and a subsequence n m such that ||σ nm − σ|| > ε for all m. However, this sequence also admits a convergent subsequence σ nm t →˜σ by Bolzano-Weierstrass, and the construction above implements˜σ as equilibrium cutoffs under (T, γ, κ). Since ||˜σ − σ|| ≥ ε however, this creates a contradiction with Lemma A.3. As a result, equilibrium cutoffs converge.
A.4 Proofs concerning Section 4
Proof of Theorem 2.
(i) Fix any κ 1 ∈ (0, 1) and consider what happens as κ 2 → 0. One of two things has to happen in equilibrium: The bottom gatekeeper either categorically rejects all proposals by raising his cutoff σ 2 → sup Σ, or the top gatekeeper accepts all proposals σ 1 → inf Σ. The limited capacity at the top rules out the latter possibility and implies instead that the top gatekeeper cutoff converges to an interiorσ 1 < sup Σ = lim κ2→0 σ 2 .
48 By continuity of the equilibrium cutoffs (Theorem 1), there exists k 2 > 0 such that κ 2 < k 2 implies σ 2 > σ 1 .
Conversely, as κ 2 → 1 − κ 1 , almost all proposals get accepted somewhere. In other words, one of the gatekeepers has to lower her standards completely by setting σ j → inf Σ. By the same argument as above, σ 1 is bounded below and hence (σ 1 , σ 2 ) → (σ 1 , min Σ) with
While these bounds depend on all parameters of the game, there exist more robust bounds for κ 1 to ensure monotonicity. To determine their value, let M j denote total matches for j when all experts approach the bottom gatekeeper first. In this situation, matches for the bottom gatekeeper are independent of the top cutoff σ 1 , allowing me to write
By the full support assumption, M 2 is strictly decreasing in σ 2 , and since the signal density varies continuously with x, the inverse s = M −1 2 (κ 2 ) exists. Let k 1 = M 1 (s, s) ∈ (0, 1 − κ 2 ) denote the bottom enrollment under identical cutoffs and exogenously fixed expert strategies.
Whenever κ 1 ≤ k 1 , it follows that
since total matches are independent of the proposal order. By the monotonicity of total matches, equilibrium cutoffs are monotone σ 1 ≥ s ≥ σ 2 .
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(ii) Consider first the case δ 2 > γ1 δ1γ1+(1−δ1)γ2 δ 1 or equivalently δ 1 γ 1 (1 − δ 2 ) < δ 2 γ 2 (1 − δ 1 ). Together with δ 1 γ 1 > δ 2 γ 2 , this condition implies δ 1 < δ 2 and γ 1 > γ 2 . Moreover, this implies
δ2γ2(1−δ1) < 1. In other words, there exists α 0 > 0 small enough such that z 1 (α 0 ) < z 2 (α 0 ), meaning that the indifference curve φ starts out below the diagonal.
As for the acceptance curve, note that any exponential signal G(σ | x) = 1 − e −ψ(x)σ with decreasing ψ : X → [0, ∞) satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio. Moreover, the acceptance function parametrized by (α(x|σ 1 ), α(x|σ 2 )) simplifies to α
, which starts out horizontally whenever σ 2 > σ 1 . By choosing two cutoffs close enough together such that σ 1 < σ 2 < log φ(α0) log α0 σ 1 ensures that ψ(α 0 ) > φ(α 0 ), implying that the acceptance function crosses the indifference function in the upwards direction somewhere below α 0 . In other words, there exist 0 < x < x = α −1 (α 0 | σ 1 ) with z 1 (x) > z 2 (x) and z 1 (x ) < z 2 (x ). By setting
, this describes an equilibrium.
Conversely, assume that γ 2 < γ 1 . The Implicit Function Theorem bounds the slope of the
50 Whenever φ(α) ≥ α, this implies for the derivatives of the secants that
In other words, the secants move in opposite direction whenever the indifference curve lies weakly above the diagonal. Since Chade et al. (2014, Theorem 1) establishes that the secants of the acceptance curve are both monotone, the two can cross at most once over that region.
No other crossings are possible whenever δ 2 < γ1 δ1γ1+(1−δ1)γ2 δ 1 or σ 2 < σ 1 , since the two conditions make sure that either the indifference or the acceptance curve lie entirely above the diagonal, respectively. And since z 1 (1) > z 2 (1), those experts with higher quality propose to the top first.
Moreover, the final match allocation may exhibit nonmonotonicities even under monotone strategies. Intuitively, experts are adversely selected after the first round of proposals, and this effect may dominate the informativeness of an individual signal when gatekeepers have similar impact.
Lemma A.4. Consider a setup with two gatekeepers, such that e −rT1 γ 1 > e −rT2 γ 2 . If
is small enough, there exists a MLRP signal function and monotone cutoffs σ 2 < σ 1 under which equilibrium match rates at the top, µ 1 (·), decrease over an interval.
Proof. Consider again exponential signals with acceptance curve ψ(α) = α β for β = σ 2 /σ 1 ∈ (0, 1). Whenever experts first approach the bottom gatekeeper, match rates at the top are given by (1−δ1)+δ1α1) which eventually drops below one as δ 2 γ 2 → δ 1 γ 1 . As a result, one can findα 2 ∈ (α 1 , 1) and β = lnα2 lnα1 such that the acceptance curve lies above the indifference curve over an interval within (1/2,α 0 ). To implement this acceptance curve, consider for instance the 50 Simple algebra shows that z j (α) =
and hence φ (α) =
can be rewritten as above. , the claim is equivalent to 2 β < β + 1, which binds at β ∈ {0, 1} and holds for intermediate β by convexity of 2 β .
σ , choose any x 0 ∈ int(X) and let σ j = ln(1−αj ) ln F (x0) . In this monotone-strategy equilibrium, match rate µ j (x) decreases around x 0 .
A.5 Proofs concerning Section 5.1
From now on, I label gatekeepers by decreasing (maximal) appeal, i.e. such that e −rτ1 γ 1 ≥ e −rτ2 γ 2 .
Lemma A.5. Let X ⊆ R describe a compact space. Suppose g i : X → R >0 for i ∈ {1, 2} satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property, meaning that
g1 (x) g2(x) is weakly increasing. Let φ : X → R be a continuous function with finite integral over X that satisfies the single crossing property
In this case,
g2(x) is strictly increasing over a set of nonzero measure, then the latter inequality is strict.
Proof. By the Intermediate Value Theorem, the image of φ is an interval. I consider first the case where 0 ∈ Im(φ), and fix any x 0 ∈ φ −1 (0). By the full support assumption of the signal function, the inequality 0 X g 1 (x)φ(x)dx is preserved when both sides are multiplied by g 2 (x 0 )/g 1 (x 0 ) > 0. The result now follows from the monotone likelihood ratio property,
Moreover, when the likelihood is strictly monotone over a nonzero set, the second inequality is strict.
Finally, if φ(·) is always positive or negative, the same equation holds in the limit as x 0 → 0 or
Lemma A.6. Consider an equilibrium strategy profile with monotone expert behavior, and let
The thresholdx is defined so that exactly those experts abovex first propose to the top gatekeeper.
Ifx > inf X, a marginal increase in turnaround time T j affects gatekeeper j's matches. By accompanying such additional delay with a capacity-preserving change in the signal cutoff σ j , gatekeeper j improves her payoff if and only if
If the sign is in the opposite direction, j's payoff is negatively affected by such a compensated marginal change.
Finally, ifx = inf X, the top gatekeeper can always improve her payoff by adding delay.
Proof. A marginal raise in T j affects gatekeeper j's matches only indirectly through the change in expert behavior. Experts react to a change in T j if and only if ∂x/∂T j = 0, which is the case for interiorx > inf X since ∂z j (α j )/∂T j < 0 whenever α j > 0. 52 As a result, her total matches and payoff decrease by
The absolute values capture the fact thatx moves in opposite direction when the top or the bottom gatekeeper add red tape, but in both instances it lowers the deviator's own matches. A marginal raise in the cutoff σ j on the other hand lowers acceptance rates everywhere, and hence
By mass-conservation, the two effects cancel out with respect to total matches,
The combined impact on gatekeeper j's payoff can thus be written as
For artificial delay that is accompanied by a nontrivial cutoff adjustment dT j > 0 > dσ j , the above has the same sign as
Finally, consider the case wherex = inf X, in which case Equation (5) trivially holds. As the top adds more and more delay T 1 → ∞ and compensates this with capacity-preserving signal cutoffs,x eventually becomes interior and (5) continues to hold by continuity, at least initially. This however implies that adding (sufficient) red tape is a profitable deviation for the top gatekeeper.
Lemma A.7. Consider a capacity-filling, monotone strategy profile σ 2 ≤ σ 1 such that the threshold typex defined above is interior to X and almost no experts are indifferent. If the bottom gatekeeper has a (weak) incentive to add marginal red tape, the top gatekeeper strictly prefers to add additional delay.
52 A change in T j affects the indifference condition for all but the worst expert, z 1 • α 1 (x) = z 2 • α 2 (x) and hence ∂x/∂T 1 > 0 and ∂x/∂T 2 < 0.
Proof. By the proof of Theorem 2(ii), the monotone behavior of gatekeepers inspires experts to do the same and rules out expert indifference almost everywhere. When the threshold typex is interior, it follows that z 1 • α(x | σ 1 ) < z 2 • α(x | σ 2 ) for x ∈ (inf X,x). In other words,
and additional delay affects matches. Suppose the bottom gatekeeper has a weak incentive to add red tape, implying by Lemma A.6 that
Since π 2 (x) < 1 if and only if x >x, removing π 2 (x) from the right side increases the value of the integrand exactly when it is positive, hence 0 ≤ X (x −x)g(σ 2 | x)f (x)dx. As detailed in Lemma A.5, the monotone likelihood ratio property further implies that this sign is preserved under a cutoff increase, 0 ≤ X (x −x)g(σ 1 | x)f (x)dx. Lastly, π 1 (x) < 1 if and only if x <x, so introducing π 1 (x) reduces negative values of the integrand. This strictly 53 raises the value of the integral, implying
By Lemma A.6, the top gatekeeper has incentives to add spurious delay.
Proof of Theorem 3. Assume that κ 1 ≤ k 1 (κ 2 ) according to the bound established in Theorem 2, ensuring monotone equilibrium cutoffs no matter the turnaround times (T 1 , T 2 ). The proof proceeds in three steps: First, I reduce the candidate equilibria by showing that it cannot entail artificial delay by the bottom gatekeeper. Among the remaining strategy profiles, I then show that there exists an unique equilibrium. Finally, I show that red tape is increasing in the impact differential.
Part I: No red tape at the bottom. By Lemma A.6, any monotone equilibrium candidate has an interior threshold typex. Moreover, whenever T 2 > τ 2 , the absence of profitable deviations for the bottom competitor implies that 0 = X (x −x)g(σ 2 | x)π 2 (x)f (x)dx. By Lemma A.7, this however implies that the top gatekeeper has strict incentives to delay turnaround even further, contradicting the equilibrium assumption.
Part II: An unique equilibrium exists. Having thus simplified the number of equilibrium param-
wherex and the cutoffs (σ 1 , σ 2 ) are given by the unique equilibrium in Theorem 1, vary continuously in T 1 and exhibit monotone strategies by Theorem 2. The comparative statics in Lemma 3.5
imply that as the turnaround time increases toT 1 > T 1 and assuming thatx is interior, the top gatekeeper's cutoff goes downσ 1 < σ 1 . Since total promotions remain constant, it follows immediately that σ 2 must go up simultaneouslyσ 2 > σ 2 . Similarly, as the top gatekeeper becomes more accepting and the bottom more selective, there is only one way the top may still respect capacity: Equilibrium must be such that fewer experts propose to her first, that is x >x.
Taken together, I now show that these observations imply the single crossing property
Indeed, wheneverx = inf X, the integral is always positive and hence Φ(T 1 ) > 0. As such, the premise first implies an interior threshold typex. Moreover, replacing π 1 (x) = 1−1 {x ≤x} α(x|σ 2 ) withπ 1 (x) = 1 − 1 {x ≤ x} α(x|σ 2 ) adds more weight to negative integrands x <x and removes weight from positive values x ∈ (x, x), thereby weakly reducing the value of the integral. Replacing (x −x) by the smaller (x − x) strictly reduces values for all x, hence
This strict inequality is maintained under the lower cutoffσ 1 < σ 1 by Lemma A.5.
Lastly, since z 1 (1) → 0 as T 1 → ∞, every expert eventually proposes to the bottom gatekeeper first. 54 However, asx → sup X, all integrands in Φ become negative and hence lim T1→∞ Φ(T 1 ) < 0.
Taken together, it follows that either Φ(T 1 ) < 0 for all T 1 ≥ τ 1 , in which case red tape is ruled out and equilibrium turnaround times are T 1 = τ 1 , or there exists an unique T 1 ≥ τ 1 at which Equation (5) binds and no further deviations are profitable. The unique equilibrium is given by this turnaround time, along with T 2 = τ 2 and the cutoffs (σ 1 , σ 2 ) from Theorem 1.
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Part III: Monotonicity in γ 1 . Suppose optimal turnaround at impact level γ 1 is equal to T 1 > τ 1 , and letα 1 = α(x | σ 1 ) describe the equilibrium acceptance rate of the indifferent expert. In this case, the optimal amount of red tape at anyγ 1 > γ 1 can be given in closed form as
which is increasing inγ 1 . This condition is equivalent to
implying thatx is preserved as the indifferent expert. Moreover, Equation (8) is strictly increasing inα 1 , implying that more red tape is necessary to maintain indifference for better types. In other 54 Since strategies are monotone, z 2 (1) = e −rT 2 γ 2 > e −rT 1 γ 1 is enough to ensure that all experts first propose to the bottom gatekeeper.
55 Capacity clearing follows from Theorem 1 and the contrapositive of Lemma A.7 rules out profitable deviations for the bottom gatekeeper.
words,
However then, (( T 1 , σ 1 ), (τ 2 , σ 2 )) describes an equilibrium underγ 1 since proposal and acceptance rates are unchanged at all quality levelsx, 56 and the delay is optimal since Equation (5) Proof. For σ 2 < σ 1 , one can write
which is strictly increasing in x.
Proof of Theorem 4. As before, asume that κ 1 ≤ k 1 (κ 2 ) according to the bound established in Theorem 2. The proof establishes three claims: The top gatekeeper's equilibrium cutoff is strictly increasing in T 1 for τ 1 small enough, the total quality of matches is monotonically increasing in red tape, and both of these properties together imply that red tape is welfare enhancing.
Part I: Red tape improves the top gatekeeper's equilibrium payoff. Since overall acceptance is independent of submission order, there exists a continuous and strictly decreasing function s 2 (σ 1 ) :
Σ → Σ such that all equilibrium cutoffs satisfy σ 2 = s 2 (σ 1 ). 57 By virtue of its monotonicity, this function is almost everywhere differentiable.
Taking into account the equilibrium adjustment of the signal cutoff σ 2 , additional red tape T 1 > τ 1 enhances the top gatekeeper's equilibrium payoff if and only if
The proof is virtually identical to that of Lemma A.6, with the only difference being that σ 2 is no longer independent of σ 1 . Since the additional term in the integral is nonpositive everywhere, it follows that Equation (9) is a stronger condition than Equation (5). Nevertheless, both of them are satisfied forx > inf X small enough, which occurs in equilibrium when the turnaround T 1 = τ 1 is short enough.
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56 Indeed, the same proposal order remains optimal for experts since z 1 (α 1 (x)|T 1 ,γ 1 ) ≥ z 1 (α 1 (x)|T 1 , γ 1 ) ≥ z 2 (α 2 (x)) for all x ≥x and z 1 (α 1 (x)|T 1 ,γ 1 ) ≤ z 1 (α 1 (x)|T 1 , γ 1 ) ≤ z 2 (α 2 (x)) for all x ≤x. 57 Formally, s 2 is the unique solution to X (1 − α(x|σ 1 ))(1 − α(x|s 2 ))f (x)dx = 1 − κ 1 − κ 2 . 58 Indeed, since κ 1 = B 1 (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ≤ X α(x|σ 1 )f (x)dx, the top gatekeeper's equilibrium cutoff is bounded above by some s < sup Σ. For any x 0 > inf X, that implies that his equilibrium acceptance rate α 1 (x 0 ) is weakly larger than α(x 0 |s) > 0 and hence
Part II: Total match quality is increasing in red tape. As T 1 increases, the comparative statics in Lemma 3.5 imply that σ 1 strictly decreases (∂σ 1 < 0) and σ 2 strictly increases (∂σ 2 > 0), and by the capacity assumption and Theorem 2, the bottom gatekeeper always sets a lower cutoff than the top σ 2 < σ 1 . In other words, as T 1 goes up, the two cutoffs move closer together.
An expert's total odds of being matched is given by µ(x) = 1 − G(σ 1 |x)G(σ 2 |x). The raise in T 1 affects these odds by
Since capacities always bind in equilibrium, overall matches are not affected by the additional red tape, i.e. dB = X dµ(x)f (x)dx = 0. This being a weighted sum over terms dµ(x) which vary continuously in x, it follows that at least one of the terms dµ(x 0 ) must be equal to zero. For any higher quality x > x 0 , Equation (sMLRP) implies that
and hence, by multiplying both sides with dσ 2 g(σ 2 )G(σ 1 ) > 0, it follows that dµ(x) > 0. By the same argument, it also holds that dµ(x) < 0 for all x < x 0 .
Together, these two observations imply that (x − x 0 )dµ(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X, and hence the total value of all matches increases,
Part III: Welfare increases in red tape. One can rewrite the welfare measure in Equation (3) as
where z 1 is the top gatekeeper's equilibrium payoff. By the above arguments, both the total quality of all matches V and the total equilibrium quality of the top gatekeepers matches z 1 are increasing in red tape for low levels of τ 1 .
A.6 Additional proofs for Section 5.2
Proof of Theorem 5.A. Consider an alternative strategy σ In other words, there exists T 1 > 0 small enough such that z 1 (α 1 (x 0 )|T 1 ) > e −rT 2 γ 2 ≥ z 2 (α 2 (x 0 )|T 2 ) for all T 1 ≤ T 1 no matter the exact equilibrium acceptance odds α 1 (x 0 ) and α 2 (x 0 ). By the definition of the threshold type, this impliesx < x 0 . baseline equilibrium exhibits red tape, Equation (2) implies that X (x−x)g(σ 1 |x)π 1 (x|σ 1 )f (x)dx = 0. The marginal deviation will remove dM matches in group A of mean quality belowx and add dM matches in group B of mean quality abovex.
The former claim is easier since σ B 1 > σ 1 > σ 2 , and hence experts propose monotonically. Indeed, by Lemma A.5, it follows that X (x −x)g(σ B 1 |x)π 1 (x|σ 1 , T 1 )f (x)dx > 0. Any change in expert proposal orders may only increase match rates belowx and decrease those above. This is because the current notation assumes first proposals from experts x ≥x exactly.
Moreover, since delay is chosen optimally, X (x −x B )g(σ . The mean quality of these additional matches is strictly higher thanx by Equation (10).
As for group A, the same reasoning implies that
However, when σ , and discretely for the indifferent experts with quality lower thanx. By Equation (11), the mean quality for the lost matches is therefore strictly belowx.
(ii) Ifx ≤x A H , red tape is larger than in the original equilibrium, T A 1 > T 1 . Indeed, any weakly shorter response time and a lower cutoff σ A 1 < σ 1 raise z 1 -scores throughout, and hence any expert abovex would still propose to the top gatekeeper first. As a result, it is possible to consider a marginal change dσ (11), the mean quality for the lost matches is therefore strictly belowx.
Having thus designed a marginal deviation that replaces some matches of mean quality lower thanx with some of mean quality abovex, it follows that σ , the top gatekeeper necessarily has slack capacity. Indeed, the analysis for group B above implies that any cutoff σ 1 > σ 1 along with the optimal delay T 1 yields fewer proposals sincex >x. As a result, the top gatekeeper has fewer total matches in either group. Conversely, for σ 1 < σ 1 withx H ≤x, the analysis for group A above implies that the top gatekeeper receives more proposals and hence more total matches. Thus, the only situation where she might receive fewer total matches under a lower cutoff is whenx H ≥x. In this case, there existsσ 1 > σ 1 along with its optimal response timeT 1 ∈ [T 1 , T 1 ] such that the matches lost by going from (σ 1 , T 1 ) to (σ 1 ,T 1 ) have a mean quality belowx. By further lowering response times slightly to some T 1 ∈ [T 1 ,T 1 ], the gatekeeper can recover the same amount of matches with higher qualities x ∈ [x,x H ]. In other words, she has a profitable deviation since she either exceeds capacity or can do achieve higher-quality matches by choosing (σ 1 , T 1 ).
Proof of Theorem 5.B. Focus first on the case with unobservable expert types, fixing the equilibrium behavior of gatekeeper one. Let function ν n 2 : [0, 1 − κ 1 ] → R + describe the payoff ν n 2 (k 2 ) for gatekeeper two under capacity k 2 and response time T 2 = τ 2 . I will first show that this function is locally convex for n large enough, and then show how this translates into a profitable deviation that involves specialization.
First, the capacity constraint uniquely pins down the optimal cutoff s .
For exponential signals, the latter is equal to e −dσ For the second derivative, evaluated at s compensated with indirect losses in the nontarget group, or vice versa. Due to the possibility of red tape, the starred term is negative by Equation (2), and it is bounded below by min x∈X (x − O(dk 2 ) dk 2 > 0.
B Comparative Statics
In this section, I consider how changes in exogenous parameters affect equilibrium strategies and payoffs. The proofs borrow from properties of the least fixed point and are relegated to the appendix. Changes in the pool of match participants can be reformulated to fit the framework above:
First, the arrival of a new gatekeeper j is equivalent to a raise in her capacity from zero to κ j and as such increases experts' payoff. Second, any additional (time-invariant) inflow of experts forces all gatekeepers to weakly raise their equilibrium cutoffs by the same logic as above.
Comparative statics for other parameters are more subtle, since they directly influence the relative attractiveness of a gatekeeper through her z j score. As intuition would have it, when a gatekeeper becomes more attractive, she will also have to be more selective in the new equilibrium.
Lemma B.2. Suppose gatekeeper j becomes more attractive through either decreased response timẽ T j < T j or increased impactγ j > γ j . In equilibrium, this leads to a raise in her cutoff σ j ≤σ j .
Proof. By the same arguments as in Theorem 1, the best response function remains monotone when component j is exogenously fixed at level σ j . I refer to this 'all-but-j' best-response function as Φ −j : Σ J\{j} → Σ J\{j} . As above, its least fixed point satisfies
The change in j's external parameters raises score z j (x) everywhere, and as a result weakly decreases π −j (x) by Corollary 3.2. With fewer proposals at all quality levels, it follows that capacities are now slack, M −j (σ) ≤ κ −j , and hence σ −j ≤ σ −j . This in return implies that there are more overall matches under (σ j , σ −j ) than under σ j , and hence gatekeeper j weakly exceeds capacity. For the greatest (and unique) fixed point of the entire game,σ = sup s | M j (s) ≥ κ j ∀j , this thus implies thatσ ≥ (σ j , σ −j ), implying the stated result.
The conclusion of this second statement is weaker since it only speaks to gatekeeper j's own equilibrium adjustment. The impact on other gatekeepers is ambiguous, as shows the following example.
Example 7. Consider a situation with three gatekeepers (γ 1 , T 1 , κ 1 ) = (1.2, 2, 0.2), (γ 2 , T 2 , κ 2 ) = (1, 2, 0.3), (γ 3 , T 3 , κ 3 ) = (1.1, 2, 0.05) and discount rate r = 10%. Experts arrive according to the uniform distribution F (x) ≡ 1. Signals are distributed exponentially, G(σ|x) = 1 − x σ . In this situation, a raise in the impact of gatekeeper 1 from γ 1 = 1.2 toγ 1 = 5 causes both gatekeeper 1 and 3 to raise their equilibrium cutoff from (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) = (3.19, 1.12, 3.34) to (σ 1 ,σ 2 ,σ 3 ) = (3.98, 1.05, 3.62).
Intuitively, all experts here propose to gatekeeper 1 before gatekeeper 3, even under the lower impact γ 1 . Due of this 'dominance' (which is illustrative, but not necessary) the surge in impact γ 1 merely steers some proposals away from gatekeeper 2 towards gatekeeper 1, but leaves the match distribution of gatekeeper 3 unchanged -at least absent cutoff adjustments. To respect capacity, gatekeeper 1 thus has to become more selective and gatekeeper 2 more accepting, and the question boils down to whether the increase in σ 1 or the decrease in σ 2 has a larger impact on matches made by gatekeeper 3. It turns out that in this instance, the first effect dominates and consequently forces gatekeeper 3 to raise her equilibrium cutoff.
Fortunately, this ambiguity disappears for the case of only two gatekeepers, since at least one opponent has to lower her threshold to maintain total capacity. Still, the joint cutoff adjustment of gatekeepers has ambiguous payoff effects for both sides of the market. While the formal statement of Lemma 3.5 is in the main text, the proof follows below.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. Since overall matches remain equal to total capacity, the two cutoffs need to move in opposite directions, with σ j weakly increasing by Lemma B.2. Moreover, absent any cutoff adjustments, the parameter change strictly increases z j (x) everywhere. In response, a positive measure of experts nearx switch proposal order, thereby upsetting gatekeepers' individual capacity constraints. By contradiction, it follows that equilibrium adjustments are strict.
